The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus poses a significant potential threat to human society due to its wide spread and rapid evolution. In this study, we present a comprehensive antigenic map for HPAI H5N1 viruses including 218 newly sequenced isolates from diverse regions of mainland China, by computationally separating almost all HPAI H5N1 viruses into 15 major antigenic clusters (ACs) based on their hemagglutinin sequences. Phylogenetic analysis showed that 12 of these 15 ACs originated in China in a divergent pattern. Further analysis of the dissemination of HPAI H5N1 virus in China identified that the virus's geographic expansion was co-incident with a significant divergence in antigenicity. Moreover, this antigenic diversification leads to global antigenic complexity, as typified by the recent HPAI H5N1 spread, showing extensive co-circulation and local persistence. This analysis has highlighted the challenge in H5N1 prevention and control that requires different planning strategies even inside China.
Because vaccination is currently the most effective way to prevent and control infections by influenza viruses, several variants of the HPAI H5N1 virus have been recommended as vaccine strains for protection of poultry 3, 16 , and it has been proposed that such vaccines should be stockpiled to be prepared for future outbreaks 3, 17 . However, due to the rapid evolution of the virus and its unknown evolutionary patterns, in many cases vaccines for poultry are not well matched to the strains in circulation, and such vaccines could actually drive the evolution of the virus [18] [19] [20] [21] . Therefore, understanding the evolution of HPAI H5N1, especially the evolution of its antigenicity in a temporal-spatial manner, is critical for efficient prevention and control of the virus. Despite multiple global efforts, the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N1 is not adequately understood 22, 23 . For ease of tracking the evolution of the virus, the H5N1 Evolution Working Group (HEWG), a joint effort of the World Health Organization (WHO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), has designed a nomenclature to classify the GsGD lineage of Eurasian HPAI H5N1 viruses 24, 25 , based on the phylogeny of the antigen hemagglutinin (HA). According to this nomenclature, all viruses of the GsGD lineage are classified into 10 clades (numbered 0 to 9), which are further subdivided into second-order, third-order and even fourth-order subclades. Although this system is very comprehensive, it is more reflective of the genetic than of the antigenic properties of the virus. For example, based on the cross-reactivity to a panel of 17 monoclonal antibodies raised against HPAI H5N1 strains, Wu and colleagues found that the seven recognized genetic clades of HPAI H5N1 (isolated between 2002 and 2007 in Asia) could actually be grouped into four distinct antigenic groups 26 . Antigenic grouping of virus strains would facilitate the recognition of emerging antigenic variants, thus aiding to the selection of vaccine strains 27 . Moreover, due to the rapid evolution of the virus, the classification of HPAI virus based on phylogenic analysis will become very complicated and hard to interpret over time.
China, especially southern China, is often quoted as the source for the HPAI H5N1 virus, owing to its complex ecology and diverse geographical features 15, 28, 29 . However, influenza virus antigenic evolution in China and its impact on global influenza dynamics is not adequately understood, in part due to a lack of sufficient viral data originating from China. In this study, we carried out the large-scale sequencing of the HA genes of 218 HPAI H5N1 viruses, isolated from representative regions of mainland China. Through accurate modeling of these newly sequenced virus and viruses with HA gene sequences available from public databases, we developed a comprehensive picture of the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N1 viruses across the globe.
Results
Sequencing of HPAI H5N1 viruses from mainland China. To obtain a better understanding of the evolution of HPAI H5N1, we sequenced HA of 218 HPAI H5N1 viruses isolated from mainland China (Fig. 1a and Supplementary Table S1 ). These newly derived sequences constituted 18% of the sequences from mainland China available until now (Fig. 1a) . Most of the sequences represent isolates from 2006 onwards, due to the difficulty to derive virus samples from earlier years. From a geographical point of view, the areas we sampled the viruses covered 16 provinces (Fig. 1a) , which represent nearly half of the provinces of the country. Important to note is that, except for Hainan, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Yunnan, the sampling covered all provinces of southern China (area south of the heavy gray line in Fig. 1b) , a region supposed to be the epicenter of the HPAI H5N1 virus 15, 28, 29 . In addition, a number of samples were derived from provinces in northern China (north of the heavy gray line in Fig. 1b ) which experienced human infections or frequent H5N1 epidemics, such as Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Shandong provinces. For provinces Chongqing, Hubei, Jiangxi and Shaanxi, the newly derived sequences outnumber those available in the public database. Complementing the newly derived sequences with sequences available in the public databases allowed for an in-depth investigation on the evolutionary dynamics of HPAI H5N1 virus in China.
The time distribution of the sequenced isolates roughly reflected the epidemic dynamics of HPAI H5N1 in mainland China (Fig. 1c) . In earlier years from 1996-1999, HPAI H5N1 virus only caused sporadic epidemics in a few provinces in southern China, such as Guangdong and Guangxi 15 . The virus became more prevalent in poultry and wild birds in mainland China after the year 2000, as shown by the increasing number of provinces experiencing epidemics. In 2005 and 2006, widespread outbreaks occurred in mainland China. In these two years, more than 15 provinces reported HPAI H5N1 epidemics, inferred from the sequences available. Although the number of provinces suffering from H5N1 epidemics decreased strongly after 2006, the virus was not eliminated: between 2007 and 2015, there were on average nine provinces with H5N1 outbreaks each year (Fig. 1c) . The situation in 2013, during which nine provinces experienced H5N1 epidemics, exemplified by the grey color in Fig. 1b , showing all were located in southern China.
High-confidence modeling of antigenic clusters of HPAI H5N1 viruses. We developed an antigenic modeling tool, which we called PREDAC-H5-C, to divide viruses into antigenic clusters (AC), based on the immunogenic part of HA protein sequences (HA1, see Methods). The PREDAC-H5-C tool facilitated a systematic investigation of the antigenic evolution of all investigated HPAI H5N1 viruses. To determine which clustering most accurately reflected the actual antigenic evolution, an antigenic dataset including 798 pairs of HPAI H5N1 viruses with known antigenic relationship (see Methods) was constructed. It should be noted that none of the viruses in the antigenic dataset had been used in training the PREDAC-H5-C model. The rationale behind this was that if the antigenic clustering accurately captured the actual antigenic relationship of HPAI H5N1 viruses, the viruses within predicted ACs should be antigenically similar, while viruses grouped in different ACs should differ more in antigenicity (Supplementary Methods). Thus, with the help the antigenic dataset, the best antigenic clustering by PREDAC-H5-C was obtained, which achieved an agreement of 0.81 with the antigenic dataset ( Supplementary Fig. S1 ). It separated a total of 5605 viruses, including 218 newly sequenced isolates and 5387 sequences collected from public databases, into 36 ACs (Fig. 2a and viruses (in most cases the WHO-recommended vaccine strain), by two letters that refer to the country/region of isolation followed by two digits that refer to the year of isolation. For example, the AC GD96 was named after the strain A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Fig. 2) . Besides for the major ACs, the other ACs were defined as minor ACs (see Methods).
When mapping the predicted ACs to the phylogenetic tree of these viruses (comparing Fig. 2a and b) , we found that a predicted AC generally covered a side lineage or comprised several closely related side lineages. We further tried to compare the predicted ACs with clade IDs as per the nomenclature system of the HEWG, but since the designated clades for H5N1 are hierarchically organized, this was not straightforward. Table S2 summarizes the correspondence between our predicted ACs and the designated clades or sub-clades. Overall, a good correspondence was observed: a pair of viruses had a probability of 0.94 to be found in the same predicted AC if they were from the same phylogenetic clade/sub-clade, and that probability was 0.90 for strains to be divided in different ACs if they belonged to different phylogentic clades/sub-clades. We further assessed how well the predicted ACs and designated HEWG clades matched with the antigenic data. The ratio of antigenically similar pairs within a predicted AC was similar to that based on HEWG clades (0.78), while the ratio of antigenically different pairs between the predicted ACs was much larger than that based on HEWG clades (0.85 versus 0.73). This suggests the predicted ACs are more accurate in describing antigenic relationships than the HEWG nomenclature system. This can be exemplified with HEWG clade 2.2, as shown in Fig. 2b Table S3 ). Interestingly, the quaternary clade 2.2.1.1 comprises two predicted ACs, EG07 and EG08, which were also reported to be antigenically different (Supplementary Table S3 ). To further demonstrate the accuracy of the predicted ACs, the antigenic relationship between viruses of clade 2.3.4 and its sub-clades 2.3.4.1 to 2.3.4.4, which circulated most extensively in mainland China in recent years, were determined with the HA-inhibition (HI) assay. The viruses belonged to 8 ACs (Supplementary Table S2) ; of these, four (AH05, GZ13, JX13 and Minor-28) were included in the assay, as shown in Fig. 2c (also see Supplementary Table S4 ). Although some antigenic heterogeneity was observed in AH05, these four ACs were antigenically all distinguishable with each other by the HI assay, confirming that by and large the predicted ACs reflect true antigenic relationships.
The origins of ACs of HPAI H5N1 viruses. To find out how the predicted ACs had originated, we dated the timing of their most recent common ancestors (tMRCA) and inferred the most probable source countries for the major ACs (Supplementary Table S5 ). As summarized in Fig. 3a , although the first strain of GsGD lineage was isolated in 1996 in the Guangdong province of China, the emergence of the first AC GD96 could be dated back to the end of 1991. Then GD96 gave rise to HN02 in the beginning of 1995. The HN02 had been hidden for years until its discovery in 2000. Remarkably, HN02 had five propagations. Two (VN04 and ID05) were generated right after HN02 appeared, while the other three (QH05, AH05, and GD04) were generated around 2001-2002. Interestingly, there was a burst of generation of four new ACs around 2006, when widespread outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 viruses were observed in China and Southeast Asia. The latest two ACs (JX13 and GZ13) were generated around 2010. We further mapped the source countries of these predicted major ACs (Fig. 3b) . Overall, 12 of the 15 major ACs were generated in China, while ID11 originated in Indonesia and EG07 and EG08 evolved in Egypt.
Antigenic diversification with the spread of the virus in China. We sought to investigate in detail the antigenic evolution of the virus in China. Figure 4A shows the overall evolutionary dynamics of the predicted ACs in China (here combining mainland China with Hong Kong) from 1996 to 2015. In the early years during 1996-1999, HPAI H5N1 virus consistently belonged to AC GD96 and mainly circulated in South China (including Hong Kong). In 2000, GD96 was replaced by the predicted AC HN02 which spread rapidly across the country. major AC QH05 and a few minor ACs became dominant in northern China. This exemplifies the antigenic complexity of HPAI H5N1 virus populations in the country. Panels b and c of Fig. 4 clearly show that the antigenic diversification of the virus was co-incident with its geographic expansion in China. We observed a significant correlation between the number of predicted ACs in circulation and the number of provinces in epidemic inferred from the HA-sequenced viruses, with a partial Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) of 0.79 (p-value 6.9e-8). On a global scale, however, there was no significant correlation between the number of predicted ACs in circulation and the number of countries with epidemics inferred from the HA-sequenced viruses (data not shown).
Global co-circulation of ACs of recent H5N1 viruses. As demonstrated above, since the detection/ discovery of the first HPAI H5N1 virus in South China in 1996, its antigenic types have altered dramatically, not only in China but also across the globe. Therefore, we further investigated the antigenic evolution of recent H5N1 viruses across the globe. As shown in Fig. 5a , the antigenic diversity in East and Southeast Asia is much larger than that in other regions, including Europe, Africa, North America and the other regions of Asia (more details see Supplementary Fig. S2 ). In addition to China in East Asia, some countries in Southeast Asia, mainly Vietnam and Indonesia, also maintained a great antigenic diversity since 2003 based on the HA-sequenced viruses. However, the composition and dominance of the antigenic types varies between countries. Taking 2006 as an example, AH05 dominated in China, while VN04 was dominant in Vietnam and Thailand, and ID05 in Indonesia; other countries reported yet other dominant ACs. Thus, antigenic differences between countries/ regions further contributed to the overall antigenic diversity in East and Southeast Asia. Co-circulation of multiple ACs coincided with local persistence of some ACs. For example, ID11 was only detectable in HA-sequenced viruses in Indonesia, where it was detected over multiple years ( Fig. 5a and Supplementary Fig. S2 ).
At a global scale, the co-circulation of various ACs is even more evident. Figure 5b summarizes the global composition of ACs in each year between 2003 and 2015. As a word of warning, the relative ratios displayed here are based on the HA-sequenced isolates, which may not reflect their true ratios due to sampling bias. Nevertheless, co-circulation of up to 11 ACs throughout the globe per year was observed since 2003 (detailed information regarding circulation of these ACs in different countries/regions over time is shown in Supplementary Figs S2 and S3) .
Finally, for comparison we analysed antigenic clusters of human influenza H3N2 viruses (Fig. 5c ), which does not show the large antigenic complexity of avian H5N1. For the human influenza H3N2 virus, there were typically one or two ACs circulating across the globe per year. The replacement of dominant ACs in the global population of human influenza H3N2 viruses in successive periods of approximately 3 to 4 years is also obvious. 
Discussion
In this study antigenic modeling was performed, based on existing HA1 sequences of HPAI H5N1 viruses and supplemented with 218 newly sequenced strains isolated during 2004-2013 from mainland China. This analysis provides a comprehensive picture of the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N1 virus across the globe. We not only tracked the origins of different antigenic ACs, but also found that generation of antigenic diversity came with the spread of the virus in China. The continuous antigenic divergence of the virus has lead to extensive co-circulation and local persistence of ACs in recent years.
The antigenic evolution of human influenza H3N2 and H1N1 viruses is reported to be in a cluster-wise and trunk-like pattern, i.e., it can be viewed as the serial replacement of one AC by another 13, 30 . In contrast, the HPAI H5N1 virus seems to evolve according to a divergent pattern, whereby ACs can evolve in multiple directions, as visualized in Figs 2b and 3 . New ACs of this strain seem to emerge at high frequencies, suggested by the emergence of 15 major ACs and 21 minor ACs from a single lineage since 1996, while for human H3N2 viruses only 7 ACs circulated during 1996-2009 (Fig. 5c ). This makes a sharp contrast to the antigenic evolution of other avian and swine influenza viruses, such as avian H9N2 20 , H7 31, 32 and swine H3N2 viruses 33 , for which only a few antigenic clusters were observed and the rate of antigenic evolution is much lower than that of HPAI H5N1 viruses. The rapid generation of new ACs of the HPAI H5N1 virus imposes a larger challenge for HPAI H5N1 virus surveillance and vaccination strategies.
It has been suggested that the source of HPAI H5N1 virus was southern China 28, 29 , and the first HPAI H5N1 virus of the GsGD lineage was indeed detected in Guangdong province of southern China in 1996 2 . Then, the 'Qinghai' virus 34 and 'Fujian' virus 35 also emerged in China. In this study, we produce a more detailed picture of the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N1 virus in China (Fig. 4a) . The result showed that the development of its antigenic diversity was co-incident with its geographic expansion in China. This may be caused in part by the continuing pressure imposed by vaccination across the country, since mass vaccination campaigns have been conducted as a routine measure for the control of avian influenza viruses in China since 2004 3, 17 . Despite these efforts, the virus has caused epidemics nearly throughout the complete country.
Besides for China, Southeast Asia and Egypt are two major host-spot regions for epidemics caused by HPAI H5N1 viruses (Fig. 5a and Supplementary Fig. S2 ). Large amounts of poultry were raised in these regions 36, 37 . Although large antigenic diversity was observed in these regions, most of the ACs circulating there were introduced from China 28, 38 . Few or minor antigenic drifts were observed in most countries except in Vietnam 39,40 , Indonesia 41 and Egypt 42, 43 where significant antigenic drift happened. It is noteworthy that, three novel ACs ID11, EG07 and EG08 were generated in Indonesia and Egypt, respectively. It is of great concern that these new ACs can cause a new round of epidemics if they move out of these countries. Therefore, it is important to strengthen the surveillance for HPAI H5N1 virus in these countries. In addition, new ACs may also be generated in the countries with dense human and poultry populations like Bangladesh and India 44, 45 . To control the HPAI H5N1 virus, vaccinations have been conducted worldwide, especially in China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Egypt, where more than 99% of avian influenza vaccines were used. As is reported in previous studies [19] [20] [21] , vaccination programs could induce faster rates of antigenic drift in avian influenza viruses, especially when there are antigenic differences between the vaccine strain and the epidemic viruses. The large antigenic diversity and frequent drifts in the above four countries suggested that vaccination may drive the antigenic evolution of this virus in these countries. To promote the efficiency of vaccination, better vaccination strategies should be adapted to match the vaccines with circulating strains. Systematic antigenic grouping of this virus could facilitate such a vaccination strategy. As is shown above, local persistence and co-circulation of ACs are widely observed for the virus, which suggests that the application of vaccines should be based on the epidemic ACs in a country/region. For countries or regions with multiple ACs co-circulating, such as China and Southeast Asia, multiple vaccines or the universal vaccine should be provided; while for most countries in Europe, Africa and Middle East where QH05 mainly circulated, the vaccine against QH05 should be enough for protection of infections by HPAI H5N1 virus.
Our study could be biased towards the sequence distribution by region. As shown in our study, most of the sequence data (70%) came from China (including Hong Kong), Vietnam, Indonesia and Egypt ( Supplementary Fig. S4 ). This could reflect their hot spot roles in HPAI H5N1 dissemination, as is exemplified by the observation that all the major ACs originated in these four countries, but it could also be a reflection of less thorough surveillance and sequencing efforts in other countries. Anyway, the viruses in these four countries captured almost all the antigenic diversity (Supplementary Table S6 ), suggesting the importance of strengthening the surveillance in these countries.
Overall, the coupling of large-scale HA sequencing and high-accuracy antigenic modeling will be a valuable tool not only for systematic understanding of the antigenic evolution of influenza viruses, but also for timely surveillance of new ACs, which could help for vaccine recommendations for HPAI H5N1 prevention and control. Table S1 ) were carried out according to the methods described in Supplemental Information. Other HA sequences of HPAI H5N1 virus with length greater than 900 were collected from the EpiFlu database of Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) 46 on January 27, 2016. The acknowledgement table for these viruses was available at http://www.computationalbiology.cn/material/. Only the sequences of HPAI H5N1 viruses in GsGD lineage were kept. All the remaining sequences were aligned using the software MAFFT 47 with an additional manual check. The non-coding regions and the region coding for signal peptide were removed for each sequence. After removing the re-assortment sequences synthesized in laboratory, the sequences with gap content greater than 10% and the sequences stopped abnormally when translated into protein, we obtained in total 5387 DNA sequences with each 960 nucleotides long. They were then translated into protein sequences. The software cd-hit 48 was used to remove the redundant sequences of 100% similarity. Finally, 2441 unique protein sequences were obtained. The information of all the viruses used in this study was available at http://www.computationalbiology.cn/material/.
Antigenic clustering based on RPEDAC-H5-C. The ACs were predicted with the computational method PREDAC-H5-C which was adapted from PREDAC, a computational method for prediction of ACs for the human influenza H3N2 virus 27 . It included four steps: firstly, the antigenic relationship between any pairs of viruses used in this study were predicted based on HA1 protein sequences with the computational method PREDAC-H5 developed in our previous study 49, 50 ; secondly, any pair of viruses which was predicted to be antigenically similar was connected by an edge, which resulted in the antigenic correlation network (ACnet); thirdly, the ACnet would be separated into clusters using the software MCL 51 ; finally, an antigenic dataset composed of 798 pairs of Scientific RepoRts | 7:43566 | DOI: 10.1038/srep43566 HPAI H5N1 viruses with known antigenic relationship were used to help determine the best antigenic clustering (details see Supplementary Methods).
Based on PREDAC-H5-C, all the HPAI H5N1 viruses used in this study were grouped into 36 ACs in total (Supplementary Table S2 ). Among them, 15 ACs were considered as major ACs, which circulated in no less than three years and caused epidemics (ratio greater than 20%) in its dominant country (the country covering most viruses of the cluster) in at least one year. The major ACs included over 97% of the viruses. The remaining ACs were defined as minor ACs.
ACnet visualization. The ACnet was visualized using the yFiles Organic layout in Cytoscape 52 . To display the network clearly in Fig. 2a , only the unique protein sequences described above and the connections between them were used (Fig. 2a) . To better display predicted ACs, the positions of some nodes were manually adjusted so that each predicted major AC had a clear boundary from the others.
Clade determination. The Phylogenetic reconstruction and bayesian coalescent analysis. To infer the phylogenetic relationship between the HPAI H5N1 viruses used in the ACnet, the DNA sequences of the viruses used in the network were used to determine the phylogenetic tree with the help of software MEGA 5.2 54 . The maximum likelihood method was used with the general reversible GTR+ I+ c4 model. The tree was rooted with the virus GsGD. The coloring and visualization of the tree were done with script colorTree.pl 55 and Dendroscope 56 , respectively. The detailed phylogenetic tree file is available at http://www.computationalbiology.cn/material/.
The time and country for the MRCAs of major ACs were inferred by Bayesian MCMC sampling using the software BEAST v1.75 57 with the SRD06 codon position model and the uncorrelated exponential clock model. To reduce the computational cost, the earliest 20 viruses in each AC were chosen for analysis after removing the redundancy by country and month. Bayesian MCMC sampling was run for up to 100,000,000 times to achieve convergence. The summary tree file is available at http://www.computationalbiology.cn/material/. 58 with ferret antisera and 0.5% turkey red blood cells. The antigenic cartography was generated with Smith's method 30 .
